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Countless studies with a wide variety of financial and economic indicators have 
been conducted over the years within the context o f international business research, all 
searching for hints or signals as to what makes the never ending process o f globalization 
progress. Our research follows these efforts while focusing specifically on Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). Our first study sets out to empirically test if  nations adopting the 
inflation targeting (IT) monetary policy are more successful in attracting inbound and 
outbound FDI cash flows than those nations utilizing alternative monetary policies. IT is 
a relatively new policy which was first put into action by New Zealand in 1990. We 
expand the original regression to inquire if the up and coming monetary policy is more 
successful for developing or developed nations, as well as using alternative dependent 
variables o f imports and exports.
Investigating FDI from the firm level, we next study the impact of cross-listed 
target firms on cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. Specifically, we 
investigate whether there is a direct link between a target firm being cross-listed in the 
acquirer’s home nation with the short- and long-run stock market returns o f the acquiring 
firms. The sample includes cross-border acquisitions (United States acquirer with a non- 
US target) from 1990-2010. Motivated by the Bonding Hypothesis, which suggests that 
by way o f a US exchange listing, managers and controlling shareholders from countries 
with weaker investor protection commit themselves to protect minority shareholders’ 
interests (Coffee 1999; Stulz 1999), we test the influence o f a foreign cross-listed target 
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INTRDUCTION
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is critical to national economic growth and 
international trade competitiveness. Previous research has explored the impact o f the 
Inflation Targeting monetary policy on controlling inflation levels and numerous gross 
domestic product (GDP) statistics; however, to the best o f our knowledge, no study has 
examined its influence on FDI directly. The first essay sets out to empirically test if 
nations adopting the inflation targeting monetary policy are more successful in attracting 
FDI cash flows than those nations utilizing alternative monetary policies. Inflation 
targeting is a relatively new policy which was first put into action in 1990; it is an 
extension of the floating exchange rate regime. Our largest regression sample consists of 
809 country year observations. We test for significance in regards to FDI as a percentage 
o f GDP, both inflows and outflows, as well as growth of imports and exports. We 
expand the original regression to inquire if the up and coming monetary policy is more 
successful for developing or developed nations. Our results provide four contributions to 
the inflation targeting literature: (i) adoption of the inflation targeting monetary policy 
has a positive impact on FDI; (ii) when isolating developing nations, that impact loses 
some significance; (iii) the impact is larger for FDI inflows than FDI outflows; (iv) the 
relationship between FDI and imports/exports is that of a substitute, not o f a compliment.
The second essay examines the impact o f cross-listed target firms on cross-border 
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. Specifically, we investigate whether there is a 
direct link between an acquired target firm being cross-listed in the bidder’s home nation 
and the short run and long run shareholder returns of the bidding firm. From a sample of
130 cross-border acquisitions (United States bidder with a non-US target) from 1990- 
2010 we find that in the short run there is a negative, but non-significant impact to a 
bidder’s shareholder value when the target firm is cross-listed in the United States at the 
time of the acquisition announcement. Long run results are also not significant, however 
the relationship is found to be positive. Our results also show targets with higher levels of 
recent growth as well as larger amounts o f free cash flows are found to decrease stock 
returns o f the bidding firm. Increased distance between the partnering nations, as well as 
higher accounting standards in the target nation also lead to lower bidder stock returns.
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ESSAY 1: INFLATION TARGETING’S IMPACT ON ATTRACTING 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
INTRODUCTION
In 1990 New Zealand became the first country to implement a floating exchange 
rate with inflation targeting as the primary focus. Since that time, New Zealand’s 
average annual inflation has been 2.29%. During the 1980’s New Zealand’s average 
annual inflation was 11.86%. Comparing the same time frames, average annual gross 
domestic product (GDP) has increased by 188%, imports by 199%, exports by 209%, and 
foreign direct investment by 86%. While inflation targeting was not the only factor 
which contributed to these impressive results, this does suggest that inflation targeting 
may have a significant influence on national competitiveness. Further illustrating this 
argument, other developed and developing countries that have followed New Zealand’s 
example by applying the inflation targeting policy have experienced similar results.
There are currently 27 countries representing six continents using the inflation 
targeting monetary policy (see Table 1) (Hammond, 2012). The new policy first became 
popular in developed nations. Nine additional developed nations looking to stabilize 
their economy took on the inflation target framework during the 1990s. Throughout 1999 
and 2000 four developing nations also announced implementation of the inflation 
targeting strategy. To date, 12 developed nations and 15 developing nations have 
adopted this policy. Regardless o f economic classification, the young monetary policy 
has served well for most participating nations in controlling inflation and increasing 
international trade (Fraga, Goldfajn and Minella, 2003). Each inflation targeting nation’s
T a b id
Inflation Targeting Nations
This table provides a list of nations that have adopted the inflation targeting monetary policy. Year IT Started is the year that the nation officially adopted inflation 
targeting according to Hammond (2012). Economic Class is according to the Wodd Bank databank, which provides four levels of income, high income, upper middle 







Target Range (H ) Nation Year IT Started
World Bank Economic 
Class
2013 Inflation 
Target Range ( h  )
New Zealand 1990 High income: OECD 1 -3 Hungary 2001 Upper middle income 3
Canada 1991 High income: OECD 1 -3 Iceland 2001 High income: OECD 2.5
United Kingdom 1992 High income: OECD 2 Mexico 2001 Upper middle income 2 - 4
Australia 1993 High income: OECD 2 - 3 Norway 2001 High income: OECD 2.5
Sweden 1993 High income: OECD 2 Peru 2002 Upper middle income 1 -3
Casch Republic 1997 High income: OECD 1 -3 Philippines 2002 Lower middle income 3 - 5
Israel 1997 High income: OECD 1 -3 Guatemala 2005 Lower middle income 3 - 5
Poland 1998 High income: OECD 1.5 -  3.5 Indonesia 2005 Lower niddle income 3.5- 5.5
Republic ofKorea 1998 High income: OECD 2 - 4 Romania 2005 Upper niddle income 1.5-3.5
Braal 1999 Upper middle income 2.5-6.5 Armenia 2006 Lower middle income 2.5-5.5
Chile 1999 High income: OECD 2 - 4 Serbia 2006 Upper niddle income 2.5-5.5
Colombia 1999 Upper middle income 2 - 4 Turkey 2006 Upper niddle income 3 - 7
South Afika 2000 Upper middle income 3 - 6 Ghana 2007 Lower middle income 6 -1 0
Thailand 2000 Upper middle income 1.5-4.5
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adoption year is provided in Table 1, along with their 2013 inflation target range, each 
collected from Hammond (2012)1.
Through inflation targeting’s early years many scholars contributed to the 
development o f the inflation targeting policy. Inflation targeting has become a key 
feature for conducting monetary policy in which decisions are guided by expectations of 
future inflation relative to an announced target (Green, 1996). Four main elements have 
commonly been included to help define the monetary policy (Svensson, 1999; Mishkin, 
2004; Heenan, Peter, and Roger, 2006; Hammond, 2012). Those features are: (1) An 
explicit central bank mandate to pursue price stability as the primary objective of 
monetary policy and high degree o f operational autonomy. (2) Explicit quantitative 
public targets used for inflation. (3) Central bank accountability for performance in 
achieving the inflation objective, mainly through high transparency requirements for 
policy strategy and implementation. (4) A policy approach based on a forward looking 
assessment o f inflation pressures, taking into account a wide array o f information (Roger, 
2010, p. 46). King (2005) provides two guidelines of the inflation targeting policy as: (1) 
A precise numerical target for inflation in the medium term. (2) A response to economic 
shocks in the short term. Jonas and Mishkin (2004) also support a medium-term horizon 
as the best focus, suggesting this allows for the inevitability of missed targets. They 
continue that if  the central bank has complete transparency inflation target misses should 
not be detrimental to the economy, or a reason to abandon inflation targeting altogether.
1 Hammond (2012) provides both formal and informal adoption dates for Ghana, Israel, Republic o f  Korea, 
Serbia, and Sweden. Consistent with the majority o f  inflation targeting studies, we use formal adoption 
dates.
6
O f course, every country participates in some level o f inflation monitoring and 
inflation control, but only a few put inflation control above all other national goals.
Many prolific central banks, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, the 
European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank have taken on certain elements of 
inflation targeting (Roger, 2010). The monetary policy which uses inflation targeting as 
its primary objective to drive all o f their monetary actions and decisions is labeled as 
inflation targeting throughout the academic literature. However, there is a clear 
difference between using inflation targeting as a tool for addressing multiple national 
goals and using it as the primary determinant o f all monetary actions within a nation 
(Nessen and Vestin, 2005). Although the primary requirements previously listed do not 
vary significantly throughout the literature, each central bank does have and uses their 
own variety o f strategies and tools within the inflation targeting framework. (Hammond, 
2012; Cespedes, Chang and Velasco, 2013)
Since inflation targeting was first put into action in 1990 there has been much 
analysis on the country level regarding what inflation targeting is, how and why it should 
be implemented, how it should be managed, and brief analysis o f what financial 
outcomes adopting countries have experienced (Green, 1996; Svensson, 1997, 1999; 
Walsh, 2002; Calvo and Mishkin, 2003; Jonas and Mishkin, 2004; Goncalves and 
Carvalho, 2009;). An early study by Fraga et al. (2003) analyzed some inflation control 
along with macro-economic statistics from a few of the early adopting nations. The 
authors found inflation targeting had been successful for developed and developing 
nations. Roger (2010) provided similar results from a brief statistical analysis o f inflation 
control by adopting nations in his paper, which served more as a call for inflation
7
targeting research rather than analysis. Further statistical analysis has been minimal and 
mixed in regards to inflation targeting’s effectiveness over controlling inflation, along 
with improving other economic indicators. A small time frame has certainly been a 
legitimate reason why. With inflation targeting approaching the 25 year mark, the time 
has come for a stream of more in-depth statistical analysis to better gage if inflation 
targeting has been successful.
This study intends to take that next step in considering inflation targeting’s impact 
in regards to foreign direct investment (FDI). Previous empirical inflation targeting 
research has focused on inflation targeting’s influence on various statistics surrounding 
inflation and it’s volatility (Neuman and von Hagen, 2002; Vega and Winkelried, 2005; 
Lin and Ye, 2007, 2009; Goncalves and Salles, 2008; Broto, 2011; Ginindza and 
Maasoumi, 2013), GDP (Ball and Sheridan, 2005; Goncalves and Salles, 2008; Siregar 
and Goo, 2010, Mollick, Cabral, and Cameiro, 2011; Abo-Zaid and Tuzemen, 2012), 
exchange rate pass through (Aleem and Lahiani, 2010; Prasertnukul, Kim, and Kakinaka, 
2010; Siregar and Goo, 2010), exchange rate volatility (Prasertnukul et al., 2010 
Pontines, 2011) and interest rates (Neumann and von Hagen, 2002).
Expanding the literature beyond these adopting nation’s specific macro-economic 
indicators, we provide the first empirical study to our knowledge to go deep into the 
cross-border business influence o f inflation targeting. Also, many past studies focus on 
just a small number o f inflation targeting nations typically within the same region. Our 
primary focus is a large conglomerate spreading across 50 nations to better generalize the 
influence o f inflation targeting. We consider past literature regarding FDI entry, inflation 
targeting practices, and inflation’s impact on international business in order to
8
empirically test whether adopting nations attract higher levels o f FDI than non-inflation 
targeting nations. The results show that inflation targeting is significant in attracting FDI 
cash flows. The attraction is slightly stronger for developed nations than for developing 
nations. However, when the developing nations are split between upper and middle 
income we do find inflation targeting to attract more FDI for the lesser developed 
nations. These findings, along with similar future studies will be critical on the firm and 
national levels for inflation targeting nations, trade partners of inflation targeters, as well 
as potential inflation targeting implementers.
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following manner. The 
introduction is followed by the theoretical and empirical review of inflation targeting and 
FDI which helps develop our hypotheses. The subsequent sections provide discuss our 
empirical research methodology and results. In the concluding portion o f the paper, we 
discuss the potential implications o f the research, as well as the limitations and future 
research possibilities.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting
Inflation targeting developed as an extension of the framework for a floating 
exchange rate. Throughout the early 1900s when globalization was first becoming a 
major factor for national economies, the issue o f how a country should manage its 
currency in relation to exchange rates became a hot topic. There emerged two primary 
strategies. First a fixed exchange rate, where a nation sets a specific exchange rate
between its currency and one of the dominant currencies around the world (i.e. US 
Dollar, Japanese Yen, or British Pound). Arguments for fixed exchange rates were 
economic stability, increased international trade, and a much needed barricade to 
speculative attacks (Nurkse, 1944).
The alternative option is a floating exchange rate, where a nation has no fixed ties 
to any other currency. Friedman (1953) argued that with the floating rate investors could 
hedge against speculative attacks through forward contracts, a nation’s central bank 
would have control over their monetary policy and be able to adjust accordingly for any 
situation, and that price levels, employment levels, and exchange rates will be free to 
balance out naturally at their most efficient levels.
Since this early debate there has been a great amount of literature arguing for each 
exchange rate extreme, while also producing a variety of combinations strategies. Calvo 
and Mishkin (2003) suggest the majority o f countries choose an intermediate path, where 
an exchange rate is often stabilized by a central bank but allowed to shift with economic 
situations, often known as a “soft peg”. However, the intermediate methods present 
another issue, what is publically stated versus what is actually applied.
This discrepancy throughout literature is known as the de jure  versus de facto  
classifications. De jure  is what the authority figures have announced their monetary 
policies to be, while de facto  describes what classification the countries actions actually 
fall under (Broda, 2004). International organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) work diligently to 
control these inconsistencies, but have little authority to make a significant impact.
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When applied specifically to inflation targeting this discrepancy may lead to the inflation 
bias. Green (1996) explains the inflation bias as the ability for monetary authorities to 
choose expansionary policies in an attempt to raise output above its potential level by 
engineering unexpected inflation (deviating from the target). Such policies would be 
fully anticipated by private agents and would serve only to raise the average rate o f 
inflation, with no impact on output. The increase in average inflation is known as the 
“inflation bias” and it has been shown that high levels o f bias can stymie economic 
growth (Svensson, 1997). Romer (1993) and Rogoff (2003) found the inflation bias of 
central banks are reduced with more open economies, where openness is defined as the 
percentage o f imports plus exports out of total GDP.
The combination of the two exchange rate regimes complicates monetary policy 
decisions even more due to the uncertainty of monetary authority’s goals and actions 
(Hoffmann, 2007). For any exchange rate policy to instill confidence domestically and 
abroad complete transparency o f all monetary authorities’ goals and actions is critical 
(Mishkin, 1998; Jonas and Mishkin, 2004). Kinoshita and Campos (2003) looked at FDI 
in transition economies and found that effective monetary institutions play a crucial 
mediating role in attracting international business, especially FDI.
It is from this ongoing debate that the inflation targeting framework has evolved. 
Its roots lie with the floating exchange rate because it typically has no set ties to any other 
currency. In order to give the exchange rate proper guidance, inflation control serves as 
the primary objective and determining factor for all monetary actions. Under the 
inflation targeting framework inflation is given a range, which allows for monetary 
flexibility with adjustments o f other economic tools to a certain extent. For example,
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2013 target ranges from the developed high income economy of Australia were 2% to 
3%, the upper middle-income developing economy of Brazil was 2.5% to 6.5%, and 
lower middle-income Ghana’s has 6% to 10% (Hammond 2012). Although inflation 
targeting is one of the many intermediate strategies, its framework addresses the majority 
o f premier topics debated throughout literature regarding exchange rate policies. (Green, 
1996; Svensson, 1997; Walsh, 2002; Fraga et al., 2003; Nessen and Vestin, 2005).
It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that scholars attempted to develop an 
underline theory to help determine the choice o f a nation’s exchange rate. Two very 
similar theoretical streams came forth in the form of the theory of optimal exchange rate 
regimes, and theory o f optimal currency areas (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Poole, 
1970). The theories did not look to determine a general answer for what exchange rate 
option was best. They attempted to develop and adapt a model that a nation or region 
could use to help determine their optimal monetary choice based on certain economic 
factors, such as financial stability, international trade patterns, and future forecasting 
among others. The literature that has progressed is typically not concerned with 
expanding on these theories, but will examine the pros and cons o f different monetary 
frameworks in relation to certain nations and economic levels. While using these models 
the debate between a fixed exchange rate and a floating exchange rate evolved into rules- 
versus-discretion debate. This took the focus off o f the policy choice, and on to the 
deeper level o f implementation and monitoring of the chosen policy (Green, 1996). This 
study looks to take on a similar form by evaluating the relatively new inflation targeting 
framework. We look to empirically test by means of an OLS Fixed Effects regression 
inflation targeting’s impact on national FDI for both developed and developing nations.
Inflation Targeting and Inflation Control
Previous studies have already shown that adoption of the inflation targeting policy 
is significant in not just lowering inflation, but also increased control over the volatility 
of inflation as well as other economic indicators. Lin and Ye (2009) looked at a group of 
13 developing inflation targeting nations against 39 control (non-inflation targeting) 
nations and found the inflation targeting policy to be significant in lowering inflation. On 
average, adopting nations help decrease inflation by an average o f nearly 3% annually. 
This study also shows inflation targeting’s significance in reducing inflation variability, 
which they defined as the standard deviation o f the 3 year moving average o f inflation. 
When doing a similar study o f 7 developed inflation targeting nations against 15 control 
nations, Lin and Ye (2007) did not find significance of lowering inflation or inflation 
variability. After controlling for hyperinflation (defined as an annual inflation rate 
greater than 40%), their results stand.
Ginindza and Maasoumi (2013) looking at 12 inflation targeters against 18 
control nations also find inflation targeting helps stabilize inflation, however there is no 
added benefit for the early adopters. Broto (2011) focused solely on South American 
countries (5 inflation targeting, 3 control) and found inflation targeting to be significant 
in lowering inflation, inflation volatility, and inflation uncertainty. Working with a 
sample o f 25 nations (14 inflation targeting, 11 control), Capistran and Ramos-Francia 
(2010) found inflation targeting reduces the dispersion o f long run inflation expectations; 
however the full effect is not felt until the third year following adoption. In sum, most 
studies show that inflation targeting adoption is effective in reducing and controlling 
inflation.
As the results for inflation targeting drift towards supporting its positive influence 
on inflation, scholars have started to branch out by testing additional economic statistics. 
Neumann and von Hagen (2002) look at inflation targeting’s influence on volatility of 
inflation, output, and interest rates for a slightly smaller list of developed nations (6 
inflation targeting, 3 control) and find results supporting the inflation targeting policy. 
However, Ball and Sheridan (2004) provide similar analysis on developed nations (7 
inflation targeting, 13 control) and find no support for inflation targeting improving these 
monetary statistics. Goncalves and Salles (2008) focus strictly on developing nations (13 
inflation targeting, 23 control) and find inflation targeters are able to lower inflation and 
lower GDP growth volatility. Goncalves and Salles also control for hyperinflation and 
retain their significance, however their cut off was measured at greater than 50% annual 
inflation. Siregar and Goo (2010) look specifically into adopting nations Indonesia and 
Thailand and find inflation targeting significantly increased GDP growth rates while 
decreasing GDP volatility. Abo-Zaid and Tuzemen (2012) using a sample o f 50 countries 
(23 inflation targeting, 27 control) find developing inflation targeters have higher and 
more stable GDP growth along with lower and more stable inflation. Developed inflation 
targeting nations were also found to have higher GDP growth and conduct more 
disciplined fiscal policy after adopting. Overall the authors suggest non-inflation 
targeting nations would benefit from adopting the policy. Mollick et al. (2011) found 
inflation targeting leads to higher output income per capita for developed and developing 
nations, however the long run effect is lower for developing nations than for developed.
Prasertnukul et al. (2010) define the exchange rate pass-through as an indicator of 
how changes in nominal exchange rates affect domestic prices. When using data from
East-Asian inflation targeters (Indonesia, Philippines, Republic o f Korea, and Thailand), 
the authors found inflation targeting helps stabilize inflation through reducing exchange 
rate pass-through and reduced exchange rate volatility. Siregar and Goo (2010) also 
found inflation targeting to be significant in reducing the pass-through effect. Aleem and 
Lahiani (2010) looked at developing inflation targeters in East-Asia and Latin America 
and found that inflation targeting helps lower exchange rate pass-through and was 
associated with a more credible monetary policy. Pontines (2011) used 23 inflation 
targeting nations and 51 control nations to find that exchange rate volatility is lower for 
inflation targeters, and the relationship is stronger for developing nations. As we can see, 
the inflation targeting literature has stayed mostly within the national economic statistics.
Inflation Targeting and FDI Entry
Past research has led several scholars to exploring how inflation rates influence 
international business, and specifically with FDI. However, the inflation targeting policy 
has not yet been directly tested on any form of international business. Past literature 
suggests that price stability may be the prime indicator o f a legitimate macroeconomic 
management by a host government (Kinoshita and Campos, 2003). A history o f low 
inflation and manageable fiscal deficits signals to investors how committed and credible 
the government is. High and unpredictable inflation serves as a proxy for 
macroeconomic instability while distorting the information content o f the market prices 
and the local incentive structure (Obwona, 2001). Under the location portion o f the OLI 
paradigm (Dunning, 1980), some authors propose that locational advantages related to 
economic policy and history are key determinants of FDI (Pugel, Kragas, and Kimura, 
1996; Kinoshita & Campos, 2003). Many studies in a variety o f economic regions have
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seen negative relationships between inflation rates and economic growth (Fisher, 1993; 
Briault, 1995; Sarel, 1996; Obwona2001).
Certainly, in the majority o f international business transaction exchange rates 
bring additional concerns and uncertainty. Pontines (2011) shows that developing nations 
with inflation targeting have lower nominal and real exchange rate volatility than non­
inflation targerters. Prasertnukul et al. (2010) also found declines in exchange rate 
volatility for inflation targeting nations Republic of Korea and Thailand. Due to inflation 
targeting nations seeing significant declines and increased stability in their inflation and 
exchange rates, the prior relationships between inflation and FDI bring us to our first 
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Nations utilizing inflation targeting will see greater increases in 
FDI as a percentage o f  GDP than that o f  a non-inflation targeting nation.
We will also run the same regression substituting FDI inflow and FDI outflow data (as a 
percentage of GDP), as well as import and export growth rates in place o f FDI as the 
dependent variable. For each of our dependent variables we expect the same positive 
correlations with inflation targeting as we do for FDI.
The Role of Economic Development
Although inflation targeting has helped economies of every level with their 
inflation, it may be best suited in aid to developing nations (Goncalves and Salles, 2008). 
The majority o f developed economies already have established and historical economic 
success. The reputations they have built will help in attracting FDI beyond what the 
inflation level contributes. Ferreira de Mendonca and de Guimaraes e Souza (2012) find
inflation targeting is the ideal monetary regime for developing economies because it 
helps bring inflation levels down to “internationally acceptable levels”, levels which are 
already in place by the majority of developed inflation targeters. Calvo and Mishkin 
(2003) also suggest developing nations have more to gain from inflation targeting 
because they typically suffer from weak fiscal, financial and monetary institutions. Fraga 
et al. (2003) explains how developing nations have the difficult challenge o f balancing 
low credibility and fragile economic institutions with higher macroeconomic instability 
and vulnerability to economic shocks.
The primary focus o f the inflation targeting strategy is certainly to control 
inflation, but expected indirect effects are economic stability, increased international 
business, and a positive reputation for its monetary institutions (Green, 1996; Fraga et al., 
2003; Roger, 2010). Garrett (2000) posits that before a country’s domestic economy can 
succeed, they need to interact through international trade. When studying transition 
economies in Eastern Europe, Kinoshita and Campos (2003) indicate that successful 
implementation o f economic reform leading to both stable economic performance and 
low inflation are strong signals for potential FDI. The wider range o f opportunities to 
positively impact a developing nation’s economy, along with their need o f international 
business leads us to our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between an inflation targeting nation and FDI will
be stronger fo r  developing nations than developed nations.
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METHODS AND DATA 
Sample
The sample consists of 27 IT nations, along with 23 control nations, separated 
into 5 regional/economic clusters. The clusters used for our analysis are show in Table 2. 
The clusters were determined based on four sources. We started with the highly 
respected and cited clustering countries piece from Ronen and Shenkar (1985). With a 
diverse range o f 27 inflation targeting nations covering 6 continents, this seminal 
clustering piece did well to include 17 inflation targeting nations throughout their 
clusters. The majority o f our non-inflation targeting (control) nations were also taken 
from their work. Next we used Sirota and Greenwood’s (1971) clusters which were 
based on similar determinants to those used by Ronen and Shenkar.
We then used the economic classification and world region of each nation from 
two sources. Descriptions were compared for similarity between the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) databases. Each nation’s classification is shown in 
Table 1. Terminology used is that of the World Bank, where developed nations are 
labeled as High Income, and developing nations include lower-middle income and upper- 
middle income labels. Armenia and Ghana are the only inflation targeting nations 
without a natural cluster group, while India is the lone control nation without a cluster 
group. Although China and India are commonly labeled as “Other” or “Independent” in 
past clustering literature, we include them as control nations due to their high growth and 
significant impact on the global economy over the previous two decades2. In Table 2
2 In unreported regressions, removing China and India from the sample did not significantly change the 
results.
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T aU efl 
Inflation Targeting C lusters
This table provides the cluster groups developed for proper control nations to be used. Data used was taken from 
Ronen and Shenkar (1985), Sirota and Greenwood (1971), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, as well as 
previous inflation targeting article samples. Ghana and Armenia are the only inflation targeting countries without a 
natural cluster, while India is the only control nation used without a natural cluster.
Anglo Eastern European East Asian Lzitin American Nordic
Inflation Australia Czech Republic Indonesia Brazil Iceland
Targeting Canada Hungary Philippines Chile Norway
Nations Israel Poland Republic o f  Korea Colombia Sweden
New Zealand Romania Thailand Guatemala
South Africa Serbia Mexico
United Kingdom Turkey Peru
Non­ Austria Bulgaria China Argentina Denmark
inflation Ireland Croatia Japan Ecuador Finland
Targeting Switzerland Greece Hong Kong Honduras
Nations United States Slovak Republic Malaysia Paraguay
Singapore Uruguay
Vietnam Venezuela
Finland is listed as a control nation, however, from 1993-1997 they are considered to be 
an inflation targeter prior to their adoption o f the Euro (Roger, 2010; Ginindza and 
Maasoumi, 2013)3. Therefore, our final sample o f inflation targeting nations is 27, where 
the non-inflation targeting control nations for comparisons settled in at 23.
The group of inflation targeting nations, as well as their non-inflation targeting 
cluster nations represents a variety of economic levels. There are 25 developed and 25 
developing nations, with nine o f the developing nations considered lower-middle income 
and 16 upper-middle income. For this reason we will be running four additional 
regressions o f the same model. The first regression will include the full sample o f 50 
nations mentioned previously. The second model will include just the 25 nations
3 During the sample time frame Finland, Greece, Ireland, and the Slovak Republic each adopted the Euro as 
their currency. In unreported regressions, removing these control nations from the sample did not 
significantly change the results.
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considered to be developing nations, while the third will consist of the 25 developed 
nations. This will allow us to test Hypothesis 2. We also go further into the developing 
group and run separate regressions between upper-middle income and lower-middle 
income classifications provided by the World Bank data bank.
O f the 27 countries adopting the inflation targeting monetary policy, their 
adoption years represent 13 different years o f the possible 22 year range. New Zealand 
was the first to implement the strategy in 1990, and Ghana the most recent in 2007.
Table 1 provides a complete list o f the adoption years. Due to the availability of data our 
final sample time frame is 1996-2012. Full monetary data from the World Bank for 
many of the Eastern European and South American nations is incomplete through the 
early 1990s. Government and Economic control variables from the World Bank are also 
unavailable prior to 1996.
Variables
Our primary dependent variable is the annual total Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDIT) as reported by the World Bank4. To gage whether inflation targeting shows a 
difference between FDI inflows (FDIIN) and outflows (FDIOUT), each measure is also 
used as a dependent variable. Each variable is measured as the annual percentage of 
GDP by the World Bank. This allows for a measure o f international trade which will not 
be skewed simply by an overall increase in an economy for a given year.
4 The World Bank Data Bank defines FDI as the net inflows o f  investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 percent or more o f  voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that o f  the 
investor. It is the sum o f  equity capital, reinvestment o f  eamings, other long-term capital, and short-term 
capital as shown in the balance o f  payments. This series shows total net, that is, net FDI in the reporting 
economy from foreign sources less net FDI by the reporting economy to the rest o f  the world. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars.
Although imports and exports are not considered to be part o f FDI, they are 
certainly a major contributor to international business and the constant strides we take 
towards a truly global economy. As Lipsey (2004) points out, although the measures are 
significantly different (between FDI and imports/exports), there has always been a close 
connection with the determining factors. Where the controversial question comes in is if 
the relationship between FDI and imports/exports is complementary, or that o f a 
substitute. Findings typically report mixed results or no significant relationship at all, 
however there is a small lean towards a complimentary relationship when significance is 
found (Lipsey and Weiss, 1981, 1984; Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Kulchycky, 1988). Most 
studies tend to use firm level data in a more isolated sample; however, by using annual 
growth in imports (IMPG) and exports (EXPG) as alternative dependent variables we 
offer a different perspective to this relationship, while also providing a wider range o f 
economic indicators to better gage where inflation targeting can benefit an economy.
The primary variable o f interest is a dummy variable for nations using the 
inflation targeting monetary policy (IT). If a country has implemented inflation targeting 
IT  will take on the value o f 1, otherwise it will be represented by a 0. This variable 
speaks directly to the primary purpose of our study, in hopes to address the question if 
FDI levels are greater for a country utilizing the inflation targeting policy. The data for 
this variable was obtained from Hammond (2012) and Roger (2010) who each provide a 
comprehensive list o f inflation targeting nations according to the Bank o f England and 
IMF respectively.
Past research shows the significance o f both economic and political factors in 
determining national level FDI (Schneider and Frey, 1985; Biswas, 2002; Bevan and
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Estrin, 2004). We apply four controls related to these national level factors that are taken 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators database produced annually by the World 
Bank5. Each is measured on a five point scale, with smaller values representing the more 
risky nations. Kauftnann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) provide the following 
descriptions for each indicator. First is a proxy for the control of corruption 
{CORRUPT). This variable captures perceptions o f the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms o f corruption, as well as 
“capture” o f the state by elites and private interests. The next proxy is for rule o f law 
(LAW), which measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules o f society, and in particular the quality o f contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood o f crime and violence.
Government effectiveness (GOVEFF) is a measurement o f the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality o f policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility o f the 
government’s commitment to such policies. The final proxy is for voice and 
accountability (VOCACCT), which is described as the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Applying these control variables 
will put all nations on a more level playing field considering the riskiness o f investing in 
the nation. Developing nations are typically more risky than developed nations. 
Therefore, the risk indicators may diminish the possibility o f finding significance for
5 From 1996 to 2002 the Worldwide Governance Indicators were only collected during the even numbered 
years. For this reason we use an average o f  the two surrounding years to provide a statistic for the odd 
numbered years.
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hypothesis 2, which predicts a difference in FDI likelihood between developing and 
developed nations.
The next control variable is a proxy for market size, measured by GDP per capita 
(GDPPC). This controls for the size and spending habits o f the economy and has been a 
popular dependent variable among inflation targeting research (Neumann and von Hagen, 
2002; Goncalves and Salles, 2008; Siregar and Goo, 2010; Abo-Zaid and Tuzemen,
2012). From Mollick et al. (2011) and Ferreira de Mendonca and Guimaraes e Souza 
(2012) we use a control for the level o f globalization (OPENNESS) of each nation, 
measured as the percentage o f imports and exports out o f GDP. Due to strong correlation, 
we use annual import and export growth as alternative dependent variables instead of 
percentage o f GDP. We also control for the population (POPULATION) by taking the log 
of the annual population for each nation.
A control for the education level (EDUCATION) o f each nation is also included, 
measured as the public spending on education as a percentage o f total government 
expenditures. As we can see from Table 3, which provides summary statistics for the 
independent variables, education severely limits our sample size. Rarely finding 
significance for the education variable, we run each regression without education in order 
to provide a larger sample size. The last control variable is the three year average lagged 
value of the annual percentage change in inflation (LAGINFLPC), in order to give 
potential investors time to react to the previous year’s inflation for a specific nation. 
Obwona (2001) asserts that creating a favorable climate for investment takes time to 
develop the partnership between the government and the private sector with the necessary
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level o f transparency. Consistent with study from Goncalves and Salles (2008) we 
remove 34 observations with annual inflation greater than 50%.
Table in
Inflation Targeting Summary Statistics
FDIT is total foreign direct investment (fdi) as a percentage o f  gross 
domestic product (gdp). FDIIN is the total inbound fdi as a percentage o f  
gdp. FDIOUT is the total outbound fdi as a percentage o f  gdp. IMPG is the 
annual growth o f  inports. EXPG is the annual growth o f  exports IT is a 
binary variable where one signifies if the country was an inflation targeter 
during the observation year. CORRUPT is a measurement o f  the nation's 
control over their corruption on a scale from zero to five. LAW is a 
measurement o f  the nation's rule o f  law on a scale from zero to five. GOVEFF 
is a measurement o f  the effectiveness o f  a nation's government on a scale 
from zero to five. VOCACCT is a measurement o f  the nation's voice and 
accountability rights on a scale from zero to five. GDPPC is the gdp per 
capita based in current US$. LAGTNFLPC is the three year lagged average 
inflation percentage change based on the consum er price index OPENNESS 
is the total US$ value o f  imports and exports as a percentage o f  gdp. 
POPULATION is the log value o f  the nation's total population. ECUCATION 
is the total public spending in US$ on education as a percentage o f  
government e>penditures. Each variable is based on the individual country 
year observation.
Variable Ofas. Mean Std Dev. Min Max
FD rr 718 7.130739 11.33165 -35.35181 101.7779
FDHN 826 4.214435 5.643436 -16.14542 52.05155
FDIOUT 718 2.734394 6.306216 -23.32876 50.06254
IMPG 813 6820356 10.95763 -50.05955 57.66691
EXPG 788 6.553736 8.467293 -31.80498 50.65073
IT 830 0.391566 0.488395 0 1
CORRUPT 830 2.987024 1.170058 0.86 5
LAW 830 2.916319 1.061946 0.81 4.51
GOVEFF 830 3.095169 1.008416 0.96 4.87
VOCACCT 830 2.921849 0.902635 0.49 4.33
GDPPC 830 16588.59 17765.72 259.7111 99557.73
LAGJNFLPC 816 0.327673 2.259284 -9.375421 26.38543
OPENNESS 827 90.26971 69.60545 14.93284 447.2391
POPULATION 830 7.288019 0.682888 5.429617 9.130557
EDUCATION 477 14.55243 4.043243 4.204572 33.10421
Also from table 3, we can see our primary variable of interest, the IT  dummy, has 
a mean o f 0.39, indicating that nearly half o f the sample years are provided by inflation
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targeting nations. FDI inflows account for approximately 60 percent o f total FDI for all 
observations. The corruption maximum score is exactly five due to the Scandinavian 
nation’s extremely low levels o f corruption.
Table 4 provides the correlation matrix for the independent variables. A couple of 
the governance indicators experience correlations above 80 and 90 percent; however this 
was expected due to the small precision scale and unavoidable overlap in the 
measurement criteria. As Allison (2012) explains, as long as the collinear variables are 
used strictly as control variables, and are not collinear with your variable o f interest, there 
is no problem with the high correlations.
Estimation Procedure
In order to examine the statistical relationship between the independent variables 
and the dependent variables of FDI and international trade we run a fixed effects 
regression analysis. The chi-squared statistic from the Housman test was 0.0024, which 
is less than 0.05, therefore confirming fixed effects is to be used over random effects. 
Fixed effects include the country specific effects as regressors rather than assigning them 
to the error term. In turn, this reduces the omitted variable bias and the sample selection 
bias (Biswas 2002). The first dependent variable equation is shown here:
Equation 1:
F D I it =  f t  +  P 2I T u +  f t C O R R U P l  +  f t , L A  Wit +  f t 5G O V E F F it 
+  P f V O C A C C l  +  f l j G D P P Q  +  f a L A G I N F L P Q  +  f t 9O P E N N E S S jt 
+  f t X0P O P  U L A  T IO f y  +  p n E D U C A T I O H
Table IV
Iaflatioa Targeting Corrdatiou Matrix
IT is a binary variable where one signifies if the country was an inflation targeter during the obseivation year. CORRUPT is a measurement of the nation's 
control over their corruption on a scale from zero to five. LAW is a measurement of the nation's rule o f law on a scale from zero to five. GOVEFF is a 
measurement of the effectiveness of a nation's government on a scale from zero to five. VOCACCT is a measurement of the nation's voice and 
accountability rights on a scale from zero to five. GDPPC is the gdp per capita based in current USS. LACINFLPC is the three year lagged average inflation 
percentage change based on the consumer price index. OPENNESS is the total USS value of imports and exports as a percentage o f gdp. POPULATION is 
the log value of the nation's total population. ECUCATION is the total public spending in USS on education as a percentage of government expenditures. 
Each variable is based on the individual country year observation.
IT CORRUFT LAW GOVEFF VOCACCT C D FFC LAGINFLPC OPENNESS POPULATION EDUCATION
IT 1.0000
CORRUPT 0.1317 1.0000
LAW 0.1153 0.9591 1.0000
GOVEFF 0.1154 0.9625 09675 1.0000
VOCACCT 0.1990 0.8177 0.8455 0.8149 1.0000
GDPPC 0.0533 0.7524 0.7470 0.7273 03964 1.0000
LAC3NFLPC -0.0079 0.1082 0.0901 0.0945 -0.0018 0.1118 1.0000
OPENNESS -0.1974 0.2557 02529 03023 •0.0066 0.1257 0.1690 1.0000
POPULATION 0.0108 -0.3989 -03445 -03436 -03891 -0.3039 -0.0552 -03175 1.0000
EDUCATION 0.0816 0.0676 0.0004 09508 -0.1313 -0.0411 0.0574 03266 -0.0034 1.0000
to01
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Where i indexes the nation, and t indexes the year. We complete this same regression for 
each of the five dependent variables, which were discussed previously in the Sample 
section.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section we present the main results o f the paper. Our primary variable of 
interest IT  is significant for seven of the nine regressions using some form o f FDI for a 
dependent variable shown in Table 5. Using the full sample we see the IT  dummy is 
significant in increasing both FDI total, and FDI inflow. When separating the sample into 
developed and developing economies we find all three FDI variables to be significant for 
developed nations, while just inflow and outflow for developing nations. These results 
provide support for hypothesis 1 that adopting the inflation targeting monetary policy 
helps increase FDI as a percentage o f GDP. However, results are similar, and slightly 
stronger for developed nations than developing nations, which is the opposite of 
hypothesis 2’s prediction. This result is largely in part to the shorter time frame for which 
developing nations have been practicing the inflation targeting policy. Brazil was the 
first developing nation to adopt inflation targeting in 1999. A longer time frame may 
provide different results once an inflation targeting nation has enough time to portray 
their progress to the international business economy.
Looking at growth of imports and exports, we find IT  to only be significant in the 
developed nation’s regressions. However, these coefficients, along with the non­
significant import and export coefficients are all found to be negative, supporting a
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substitution relationship between FDI and imports/exports. Lagged inflation and trade 
openness are the most frequently significant control variables. Openness has a positive 
relationship with all DVs for the full sample, but becomes split with the sub-samples, 
significant for FDI with the developed nations and for imports and exports with 
developing. The three year lag in inflation is significant for attracting imports and exports 
for all regressions, and for inbound FDI in the full sample and developed nations. Of the 
World Bank governance indicator variables, government effectiveness, rule o f law, and 
control o f corruption all carry significant variables in just 4 of the 15 regressions, and 
randomly spread out as well. Voice and accountability was never found to be significant.
The education variable was not found to be significant in any o f the 15 
regressions reported in Table 5. Removing this variable increases the full sample size by 
nearly 300 observations (435 to 710 for FDIT), and for developed and developing sub­
samples by 100 to 200 observations depending on the regression provided in Table 6. The 
results for IT  are nearly identical to the original regression; however, we find much more 
significance for import and export growth. Both regressions now find IT  to be significant 
for both imports and exports in the full sample and developing nations, while maintaining 
the negative relationship. We also maintain the strong positive relationship from trade 
openness, being significant in 14 of the 15 regressions, while the three year lag in 
inflation maintains its significant negative relationship with imports and exports.
In Table 7 we use the World Bank’s economic classifications to break down the 
developing nations sub-sample into upper-middle income and lower-middle income. 
Although this causes the sample sizes to decrease, interesting significant results are still 
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O m lq p b g  Econoniet Fixed Effects Results
Sub*sanple find effects regression using the World Bank economic classifications with five measurements of mtemaoonai trade as the dependent variable for three 
sanple groups. UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME is a sub-sample consisting of the 16 (9 inflation targe ten) move advanced nations from the previously used DEVELOPING 
NATIONS sample. LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME is a sob-sample consisting of the 9 (5 inflation targeters) lets advanced nations horn the previously used DEVELOPING 
NATIONS sample. FDIT is total foreign dfrect investment (for) as a percentage of gross domestic product (gdp). FDDN is the total inbound fdi as apercentage ofgdp. 
FDIOUT is the total outbound fdi as a percentage o f gdp. IMPG is the annual growth of imports. EXPG is the annual growth of exports. IT is a binary variable where one 
signifies if the country was an inflation taigeter during the observation year. CORRUPT is a measurement of the nation’s control over their corruption on a scale from zero 
to five. LAW » a measurement of die nation's rule of law on a scale from zero to five. GOVEFFis a measurement of die effectiveness of a nation's government on a scale 
from zero to fiv e. VOCACCT is a measurement of the nation's voice and accountability tights on a scale from zero to five. GDPPC is the gdp per capita based in current 
USS. LAGNFLPC is the three year lagged average inflation percentage change based on the consumer price index OPENNESS is the total USS value of reports and 
exports as a percentage of gdp. POPULATION is die log value o f the nation** total population. ECUCATfON is the total public spending in USS on education as a 
percentage of government expenditures. Each variable is based on die individual country year observation. F-vahie* are provided re parenthesis, where * indicates 
significance at die \Q% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates significance at the \% level.
U P P E R -M ID D L E  IN C O M E L O W E R -M ID D L E  IN C O M E
FWT IDON FDIOUT D F G EXPG FDTT FDDN FD35UT IMPG EXPG
IT -35351 -2.7262 -06577 -6.7625 -8.8845** ♦ 12211 0.9688* 03541 18161 48113
(0.516) (0298) (0.843) (0320) (0.000) (0.112) (0.082) (0.732) (0.629) (0317)
CORRUPT 18266 1.3929 0.2590 9.4552 13.8462*** 1.7394 43693 0.7464 -15.7469 -15.4440
(0.739) (0.708) (0954) (0395) (0.002) (0282) (0213) (0244) (0.406) (0339)
LAW 1.1585 1.5376 0.7103 173876* 9.0674 13217 12252 -12091* 284695 23.6311
(0.844) (0030) (0789) (0399) (0.156) (0.146) (0.637) (0394) (0.154) (0.183)
GOVEFF -5.9420 -1.9734 -3.9333 5.6210 -2.4094 3.4511 1.4508 10295** -43.8135** -21.5461
(0.518) (0.670) (0369) (0.655) (0.670) (0.147) (0465) (0342) (0.011) (0301)
VOCACCT 5.2294 3.6069 1.3377 5.0634 -03794 -26126*** -2.4277 -0.1814 03428 33884
(0258) (0.181) (0629) (0.427) (0.574) (0301) (0-151) (0.744) 01.952) (0.444)
GDPPC 0.0036** 0.0016* 0.0019* • -00008 -0.0003 0.0006* 0.0000 03002 03015 •0.0017
(0.018) (0.009) (0029) (0535) (0373) (0392) (0965) (0289) (0674) (0.687)
LA dN FLPC -0.4873 -0.1014 -0.4214 -4.1236*** -0.6895** 1.5050** -0.4893 02678 -3.9780 *6.7713
(0.480) (0.803) (0.118) (0.000) (0.013) (0.044) (0606) (0.446) (0264) (0297)
OPENNESS 0.2778* 0.1876** 0.0911 0.4990* *♦ 03284** 0.0732** 0.0108 0.0144** 05833** 05268***
(0.080) (0.012) (0.331) (0.006) (0.014) (0.022) (0294) (0.027) (0.027) 0.000
POPULATION -136.8201** -66.1520* •• -68.1046* 1312495** 61.7551 03541 185987 0.8789 393713 42.6737
(0.039) (0.005) (0.063) (0.021) (0.110) (0.976) (0.173) (0.809) (0.649) (0.384)
EDUCATDN -0.6594** -02426** -0 3920** -0.7795 -0.1453 0.0000 0.0596 -0.0250 0.0160 •02909
(0.031) (0.039) (0.018) (0202) (0.466) (1.000) (0.488) (0335) (0.988) (0.663)
CONS 997.181** 470681* 507257* -1099.775** -526582* -15597 -154.488 -10.767 -273.162 -336.408
(0.043) (0.008) (0.058) (0.011) (0.078) (0.872) (0.145) (0.714) (0.683) (0.404)
R-Squared 0.395 0.369 0.396 0.277 0.240 0.508 0.492 0368 0286 0266
O fctervadou 115 125 115 125 125 51 61 51 56 56
U>
o
only for the upper-middle income regressions. Openness continues to be significant and 
positive, while GDP per capita became highly significant in the upper-middle income 
group. The positive GDP per capita result is somewhat expected because this group 
would be those nations that have seen the greatest growth and transition over the time 
period, including many o f the Eastern European and South American nations.
Removing education from this sample nearly doubles the sample sizes. Shown in 
Table 8 we see IT  has a significant negative relationship with both growth o f imports and 
exports for upper-middle income. IT  is positive for FDI total and FDI inflow for lower- 
middle income, as well as negative for import growth. Tables 7 and 8 provide some 
support that going deeper than just developed vs developing may offer relevant 
information. Imports and exports tend to decrease more in the upper-middle income 
nations from inflation targeting, while it helps lower-middle income attract more foreign 
direct investment. Although the full sample results suggest the inflation targeting 
influence is stronger for developed than developing nations, tables 7 and 8 provide partial 
support for hypothesis 2, that less developed economies have a stronger relationship 
between inflation targeting and FDI. The comparison in these regressions happens to be 
between lower and higher levels o f developing nations, as opposed to developing versus 
developed as hypothesis 2 speculated. These interesting results suggest that further 
studies separating developing nations into multiple groups can provide better insight into 
inflation targeting’s potential value.
In sum, these results provide support that adoption o f the inflation targeting 
monetary policy will positively impact a nation’s involvement with foreign direct 
investment. At the same time, inflation targeting has a negative influence on imports and
TaUtVIl
Developing Eeomriei M in s Education Fixed Effects Ret nits 
Sub-sample, excluding the variable EDUCATION fixed effects regression using die Wodd Bank economic classifications with five measurements of international trade as 
the dependent variable for three staple groups. UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME is a sub-staple consisting of the 16 (9 inflation tmrgeters) tnoie advanced nations from the 
previously used DEVELOPING NATIONS sample. LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME is a sub-sanple consisting o f die 9 (5 inflation targeters) less advanced nations from the 
previously used DEVELOPING NATIONS sample. FDIT is total foreign direct investment (fdi) as a percentage of gross domestic product (gdp). FDtlN is the total inbound 
fdi as a percentage of gdp. FDIOUT is die total outbound fdi as a percentage of gdp. IMPG is the annual growth of inports. EXPG is the annual growth of erpoits. IT is a 
binary variable where one signifies if the country was an inflation targeter during the observation year. CORRUPT is a measurement o f die nation's control over their 
corruption on a scale from zero to five. LAW is a measurement ofthe nation's rule of law on a scale from zero to five. GOVEFF is a measurement o f die effectiveness of a 
nation’s government on a scale from zero to five. VOCA OCT is a measurement o f die nation's voice and accountability rights on a scale from zero to five. GDPPC is the gdp 
per capita based in current USS. LACHNFLPC is die three year lagged avenge inflation percentage change based on the consumer price index. OPENNESS is the total USS 
value of imports and exports as a percentage of gdp. POPULATION is die log value ofthe nation’s total population. ECUCA TION is die total public spending in USS on 
education as a percentage of government expenditures. Each variable is based on the individual country year observation. F-vahies are provided in parenthesis, where * 
indicates significance at die 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; ** * indicates significance at the 1% level.
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME
FDIT FDUN FDIOUT IMPG EXPG FDIT FDDN FDIOUT IMPG EXPG
IT -1.0391 -0.9598 -0.1687 -7.6856** -6.4374*** 1.1990** 1.4386* 0.0240 -59179** -3.4605
(0.636) (0.398) (0.878) (0.040) (0.001) (0.011) (0.056) (0611) (0.029) (0.111)
CORRUPT 0.5797 1.1480 -1.3762 3.3294 10.1017*** 26416 16355 0.4188* -164138 -11.7653
(0.877) (0.423) (0.477) (0739) (0.005) (0.159) (0643) (0.083) (0267) (0242)
LAW 3.4862 1.8642 1.2030 7.4373 7.1288* -0.6016 0.8246 -16929** -0.6897 -22788
(0.315) (0228) (0.592) (0280) (0.086) (0.749) (0.428) (0.016) (0.955) (0.819)
GOVEFF -5.4968 -2.1711 -2.7079 -4.1576 -5.3550 1.6515 1.8455 1.3121 -42181 -8.4788
(0.370) (0.411) (0.412) (0.609) (0.159) (0.508) (0223) (0.131) (0.631) (0627)
VOCACCT 2.0833 1.7403 0.1835 6.5755 -1.5867 -2.4826*** 0.4944 -0.0457 49192 6.0889
(0267) (0.139) (0.877) (0297) (0.566) (0.003) (0.436) (0.871) (0213) (0.166)
GDPPC 0.0013 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007** 0.0006** 0.0003 0.0002 06056** 0.0004
(0.147) (0.174) (0.152) (0211) (0.023) (0.014) (0.338) (0204) (0.031) (0.832)
LAONFLPC 0.1218 0.0597 0.0106 -1.6110 -0.1647 06032** 0.0787 -0.0181 -4.5270*** -46812**
(0.795) (0.674) (0965) (0.139) (0668) (0.033) (0.826) (0.787) (0.002) (0.012)
OPENNESS 0.2011* 0.1110** 0.0751 0.3407** 02529*** 0.0682*** 0.0337*** 06099* 0.1819 0.1248
(0099) (0.032) (0281) (0.006) (0608) (0601) (0.010) (0.063) (0211) (0255)
POPULATION -69.7537 -30.7345* -36.7228 125.1393** 436778** -89992 0.0690 -22842 -28.8255 246126
(0.187) (0.074) (0243) (0033) (0636) (0.147) (0.991) (0433) (0658) (0.495)
CONS 518.086 221.727* 280233 -993.420** -359605* ♦ 64403 -10.877 16298 232669 -158.051
(0.198) (0.089) (0239) (0.029) (0.029) (0201) (0.827) (0462) (0651) (0672)
R-Sqnared 0.175 0.149 0.179 0109 0.151 0697 0400 0250 0.151 0206
Observations 214 250 214 249 249 103 144 103 133 133
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exports, suggesting the two dependent variables have a substitution based relationship as 
opposed to a complimentary suggested by Lipsey (2004). The impact on developing 
nations may take longer to gain significance due to the larger risk that comes from doing 
business in these nations, but the shift from imports/exports to foreign direct investment 
is certainly underway for nations adopting the young monetary policy.
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ESSAY 2: DO CROSS-LISTED TARGETS MAKE A DIFFERENCE 
IN CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS?
INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
Although much literature has shown, from the perspective of the acquiring firm, 
that domestic merger and acquisition (M&A) activity results in higher shareholder value 
than when acquiring a foreign target (Moeller and Schlingemann 2005; Martynova and 
Renneboog 2008; Cosset and Meknassi 2013a), the trend o f cross-border M&A activity is 
not slowing down. The inevitability of globalization and the increasing integration o f the 
world’s financial markets keep firms looking for cross border targets.
Market segmentation and cultural disparities are the primary difficulties leading to 
the lower returns associated with cross border M&A. However, along with the negatives 
come the potential for greater growth opportunities by way of access to previously distant 
markets that may provide a less competitive product market, reduction in operating costs, 
or a more appealing institutional environment. Many firms have looked at cross-listing 
on a foreign market, typically a more established market such as the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), London Stock Exchange (LSE), or Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), in 
order to alleviate the concerns large multinational enterprises (MNEs) have when 
considering a cross border acquisition.
Cross-listing requires firms to take on a new set o f regulations, which usually 
includes higher standards than that of their domestic market. From the transparency 
cross-listed firms are subject to, they are able to reduce the amount o f information 
asymmetries for potential acquirers due to the newly enhanced level o f disclosure and
increase in analyst coverage (Lang, Lins and Miller 2003; Cosset and Meknassi 2013b). 
For this purpose, our study focuses on the short run and long run impact to shareholder 
value with consideration of cross-listed targets against non-cross-listed targets. To help 
control for the variety of economies, both developed and developing, we focus strictly on 
United States bidders acquiring a foreign target. Cosset and Meknassi (2013a), with a 
sample o f acquisitions from any combination o f bidder/target countries, found that cross­
listed targets lead to better acquirer long run returns, however short run reaction around 
the announcement date was not found to be significant. It should be noted that their 
sample was not limited to publically traded target firms, which allowed for more 
observations but hinders the reliability of, and accessibility to the financial data o f the 
target firms.
Using primarily the same data set, Cosset and Meknassi (2013b) showed that 
cross-listed firms are more likely to be M&A targets than non-cross-listed firms. 
Acquirers benefit from the enhanced disclosure and increased analyst coverage, as well 
as an increased knowledge of the local market and culture of the cross-listed target.
Target firm financial information and the target nation’s culture and economy have also 
been shown to significantly impact an acquiring firm’s returns at the time o f an 
acquisition announcement (Palepu 1986; Powell 1997; Sarkissian and Schill 2004; 
Moeller and Schlingemann 2005; Lei and Miller 2008; Cosset and Meknassi 2013a).
Our study provides the first analysis o f the impact o f cross-listed targets while 
limiting the acquirer nation to just one possibility, the United States. Consistent with 
Cosset and Meknassi (2013a), we show that after controlling for appropriate financial and 
cultural variables, the effort to acquire a cross-listed firm does not lead to an increase in
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the acquirer’s short run stock return. The coefficient direction suggests acquiring a cross­
listed firm actually results in lower bidder returns, however the results are not found to be 
significant. The direction of the cross-listing dummy for long run returns was positive; 
however, unlike Cosset and Meknassi (2013a) we do not find the results to be statistically 
significant.
Free cash flow of a target firm has seen mixed results in the past, we find 
significance here that it decreases bidder short run returns, as does a higher accounting 
standard in the target’s home nation. We also find partial support to past literature that 
acquirer returns are lower when the target firm is from a more geographically distant 
nation (Martin and Valazquez 1997; Bevan and Estrin 2004). Contradictory to Roll’s 
(1986) hubris hypothesis, we find that the size o f the acquiring firm increases their short 
run returns, refuting the claim that larger firms will make poorer decisions, however the 
relationship is only significant in one o f four regressions
The rest o f this article proceeds as follows. In the following section we describe 
our data sources, sample selection and methods. Next we provide and interpret our OLS 
regression results. We then conclude the paper, discuss limitations, and encourage future 
research.
METHODS AND DATA 
Sample Selection
The acquisition data was collected from Thomson’s Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Merger and Acquisition database and covers the time period January 1st, 1990
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through December 31st, 2010. To be included in the sample, transactions must meet the 
following criteria. An event announcement and deal completion must both take place 
within the twenty-one year span. All acquisition events were limited to publically traded 
United States bidders acquiring a publically traded non-US target. In line with a study by 
Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2009), we removed transactions which include 
target firms headquartered in OECD classified Tax-Havens6. We also remove all 
acquisitions involving firms from the finance industry, those with 6000-6999 SIC codes.
In order to be considered for this study the transaction value must have been 
publically disclosed, while reaching the minimum value of one million US dollars 
(Moeller and Schlingemann 2005). The US bidder must also maintain ownership o f less 
than 50% of the target firm prior to announcement, while ending the deal with an 
ownership level within the 75% to 100% range. Once these requirements were used to 
sort the data we were left with 227 cross border acquisition observations. After removing 
observations for missing target firm financial data the sample size ended with 130 cross- 
border acquisition observations.
From the aforementioned sample, the cross-listing status o f each target firm is 
recorded to provide the dummy variable CROSSLIST, which serves as our primary 
variable o f interest. If the target firm for a given acquisition is cross-listed in the United 
States prior to the date o f the announcement, that observation takes on the value of 1, 
otherwise 0. The cross listing status is taken from SDC, where a firm is to be considered 
as cross-listed if it is directly listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX. 23 o f the 130
6 The list o f OECD Tax Haven n a tions is located  in th e  appendix.
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observations (approximately 18%) included a foreign target that was cross-listed on a 
United States financial market at the time of the announcement.
Table 9 provides acquisition sample statistics broken down by acquisition year 
(Panel A) and target nation (Panel B). From Panel A we can see that over 90% of the 
sample acquisitions (total and cross-listed) have taken place between 1997 and 2010. 
There also does not appear to be a slowdown in acquisition activity during and following 
the global financial crisis of 2008. The sample is already too small to remove 
observations or attempt sub-samples, however it should be noted that nearly half o f the 
acquisitions took place in Canada and the United Kingdom. These nations are the two 
most closely integrated economies to the United States and are commonly removed from 
samples for a robustness check. Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, and Taiwan7 are the only 
target nations not considered to be a high income developed economy by the World 
Bank. The other 17 target nations representing 123 o f the 130 acquisitions each have 
High Income status from the World Bank and are members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Canada and the United Kingdom also make up nearly half o f the cross-listed 
acquisition observations, with seven and three cross-listed targets respectively.
Interesting enough six o f the eight target firms in Israel were cross-listed at the time of 
announcement. After these three nations, South Korea’s two cross-listed targets make 
them the only other country to have more than one cross-listed acquisition.
7 SDC lists M&A activity separately for Taiwan even though it is officially part o f  the Republic o f  China.
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Table DC
C ross-Listed Acquisition Statistics
Panel A provides a list o fthe  total number o f  cross-border acquisitions that took place during 
each year o fth e  sample time frame. Cross-Listed provides the number o f  acquisitions each 
year that involved a target firm that was cross-listed on a United States stock exchange prior 
to the acquisition announcement. Panel B provides a list o fthe  total number o f  cross-border 
acquisitions sorted by the target firm's home country. Cross-Listed provides the number o f  
acquisitions for each country that involved a target firm that was cross-listed on a United 
States stock exchange prior to the acquisition announcement. The acquisition data was 
collected from Thomson’s Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Merger and Acquisition 
database and covers the time period January 1st, 1990 through December 31st, 2010._________
Panel A : Panel B:
Year Acquisitions C ross-Listed T arget Nation Acquisitions C ross-Listed
1991 1 0 Australia 10 0
1992 1 0 Belgium 3 0
1993 1 0 Brazil 1 0
1994 2 0 Canada 39 7
1995 3 0 Denmark 2 0
1996 1 0 Finland 1 1
1997 6 0 France 11 0
1998 6 2 Germany 5 0
1999 6 2 Greece 1 1
2000 6 1 Israel 8 6
2001 6 2 Japan 3 0
2002 14 2 Malaysia 1 0
2003 7 3 Mexico 1 1
2004 15 2 Netherlands 2 1
2005 11 2 Norway 3 0
2006 6 3 South Korea 3 2
2007 10 1 Spain 1 0
2008 9 2 Sweden 3 0
2009 10 1 Switzerland 3 1






Total 130 23 Total 130 23
Dependent Variables
Using EVENTUS and the Fama and French (1992) 3-factor model we calculate 
short run cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), a proxy for shareholder value, for each 
bidder’s announcement period using historical daily stock data. We also apply a GARCH 
model in obtaining long run buy-and-hold returns (BHARs). The returns, which serve as
40
our dependent variable, are collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
database (CRSP). We test both short run and long run returns for the United States 
acquiring firms. For short run returns two time frames surrounding the acquisition 
announcement date are used, a three day (-1, 1) and seven day period (-3, 3) (Conn, Cosh, 
Guest and Hughes 2005; Cosset and Meknassi 2013a). For long run returns we use five 
years after the announcement (Loughran and Ritter 1995; Loughran and Vijh 1997; Rau 
and Vermaelen 1997). In order to check for robustness o f the short run results we perform 
regression analysis using both the equally weighted and value weighted indexes obtained 
from CRSP.
In Table 10 we provide the summary statistics for the 130 observations. It should 
be noted that the average CAR for the short run dependent variables range from -0.0043 
through 0.0012, with 3 o f the 4 being negative. This suggests that regardless o f a target 
being cross-listed or not, on average cross-border acquisitions lead to a short-run 
decrease in shareholder value for the acquiring firm, which confirms previous findings 
that the costs of global diversification outweigh the benefits from the viewpoint of the 
bidding firm (Denis, Denis and Yost 2002). However, looking at long run BHARs we do 
see a positive average, suggesting the initial loss in value is off set by the long run 
performance following the acquisition.
Control Variables
We use a variety of control variables for firm, transaction, and country 
characteristics to better evaluate the potential impact from acquiring a cross-listed firm. 
We obtain target firm level and transaction variables from SDC, while acquiring firm 




EW CAR (-1,1) is the three day equal weighted cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm 
surrounding the acquisition announcement date. EW CAR (-3,3) is the seven day equal weighted 
cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm surroundingthe acquisition announcement date VW 
CAR (-1,1) is the three day value weighted cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm 
surrounding the acquisition announcement date. VW CAR (-3,3) is the seven day value weigited 
cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm surrounding the acquisition announcement date 
BHAR S YEAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for the five year period following the acquisition 
announcement date CROSSLIST is a binary variable where one signifies if the targa firm was cross­
listed on a United States stock exchange prior to the acquisition announcement SIZET is the log of the 
target firm market value four weeks prior to the announcement. LEVERAGE! is the targ t firm total 
debt divided by total assets. GROWTHT is the target firm three year average gowth rate in sales. 
FCFT is the target firm free cash flow divided by total assets. CULTPROX is a binary variable where 
one signifies if both the acquirer and target nations speak the same langiagp or were previously part of 
the same colonial empire GEOPROX is the distance (1000 miles) between the capital city of the 
acquirer and target nations. INVPROTECT is a measurement of the target nation's legil protection of 
shareholders and creditors on a scale from zero to one ACCTSTAND is a measurement of the target 
nation's level of transparency to outside investors as well as factors related to accounting and disclosure 
standards on a scale from zero to one. SIZEA is the log value o f the acquiring firm's market value four 
weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. LEVERAGEA is the acquiring firm's total debt divided 
by total assets. FCFA is the acquiring firm's free cash flow divided by total assets TWODIGSIC is a 
binary variable where one sigiifies if the acquiring and target firms share the same two digt SIC code 
DEALVALUE is the log value of the acquisition transaction cost. CONTESTED is a binary variable 
where one sigiifies if there was more than one bidder for the target firm TOEHOLD is the percentage 
of target firm equity owned by the acquiring firm prior to the acquisition
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
EW CAR (-1,1) 130 -0.0026 0.0529 -0.2034 0.1511
EW CAR (-33) 130 0.0012 0.0745 -0.2752 0.2421
VW CAR (-1,1) 130 -0.0043 0.0540 -0.2113 0.1563
VW CAR (-3,3) 130 -0.0024 0.0770 -0.2588 0.2477
BHARSYEAR 126 0.0010 0.0016 -0.0035 0.0065
CROSSLIST 130 0.1769 0.3831 0.0000 1.0000
SIZET 130 2.2164 0.7257 -0.6655 4.1148
LEVERAGET 130 0.1647 0.1951 0.0000 1.1476
GROWTHT 130 0.3984 2.4139 -0.1795 27.2793
FCFT 130 1.8010 2.9346 0.0088 24.4502
CULTPROX 130 0.5692 0.4971 0.0000 1.0000
GEOPROX 130 3.7135 2.7917 0.4558 9.9118
INVPROTECT 130 0.6825 0.2483 0.0679 0.9592
ACCTSTAND 130 71.5692 6.1328 54.0000 83.0000
SIZEA 130 3.7135 1.0321 1.9289 9.6549
LEVERAGEA 130 24.4126 16.7446 08480 97.7550
FCFA 130 0.0424 0.0757 -0.3750 0.3633
TWODIGSIC 130 0.5923 0.4933 0.0000 1.0000
DEALVALUE 130 2.2756 0.7135 0.2686 4.2734
CONTESTED 130 0.1077 0.3112 00000 1.0000
TOEHOLD 130 12.4141 17.2275 0.0000 47.3600
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data is taken from the firm’s fiscal year end preceding the date of the announcement 
except for firm size, which is taken as the market value of the firm four weeks prior to the 
announcement by both databases.
Target Firm Characteristics
The first control variable is the target firm size {SIZET)8, which is measured as the 
logarithm of the target’s market capitalization in US dollars. Acquisitions generate 
substantial costs related to the integration of the target firm into the acquirer’s 
organizational structure. As the potential target firm gets larger, the costs associated with 
takeover also increase. Therefore, the larger the size o f the target firm, the smaller the 
list of potential bidders becomes due to the strict financial demands (Powell 1997). In a 
study attempting to model takeover likelihood in a sample dealing primarily with firms 
from the United Kingdom, Powell (1997) found target size to have a significant negative 
influence on the likelihood of being acquired. In a similar follow up paper by Powell 
(2004), he confirms this negative influence from target size, and claims this relationship 
has received the most consistent support in the takeover literature.
The next two control variables come from the Growth-Resource Imbalance (GRI) 
theory, which Palepu (1986), using strictly US firms from the 1970s, finds support for in 
an empirical study comparing acquisition targets with non-targets. The GRI theory 
suggest that two combinations o f a firm make for good targets, low growth—resource rich 
firms, and high growth—resource poor firms. Variables of firm leverage and growth have 
previously been shown to increase the value of an acquisition (Palepu 1986; Powell
8 To distinguish between bidder and target firm financial data we attach a T to the end o f  the name i f  the 
variable is from the target firm, and an A if  from the acquiring firm.
1997). Firm growth (GROWTHT) is measured as the rolling average three year growth 
rate in total sales, while leverage (LEVERAGET) is measured as the ratio o f the target’s 
total debt to total assets. High growth and high leverage (financially constrained) firms 
are more likely to be targeted since they have limited bargaining power, making them 
attractive targets. Targets with low growth and low leverage are more suitable for bidder 
firms simply looking to absorb resources (Cosset and Meknassi 2013 b), as opposed to 
completing a mutually beneficial merger.
Another control variable is free cash flow (FCFT), which is measured as the ratio 
o f the target firm’s free cash flow to total assets and has been shown to have a positive 
relationship with the likelihood of acquisition (Palepu 1986; Powell 1997, 2004). Jensen 
(1986) explained how free cash flows are expected to be distributed back to the 
shareholders (the true firm owners) in order to maximize firm value and efficiency. He 
continues that firms with incompetent management teams that have performed poorly, 
and firms that have done exceptionally well and have accumulated and kept large free 
cash flows are the most likely targets. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) found support for this 
part o f Jensen’s theory in a piece looking at free cash flows of firm’s going private 
throughout the 1980s. However, Lang, Stulz and Walking (2001) find that target free 
cash flows have a negative relationship with bidder returns when the bidder has a low 
Tobin’s Q value, and no relationship for high Q targets.
Target Country Characteristics
The Bonding Hypothesis suggests that, in relation to our US bidder/Foreign target 
acquisitions, by way of a US exchange listing, managers and controlling shareholders 
from countries with weaker investor protection commit themselves to protect minority
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shareholders’ interests (Coffee 1999; Stulz 1999; Lei and Miller 2008). Firms from 
countries with weaker legal protection for minority shareholders list abroad more 
frequently than do firms from other countries (Pagano, Roell, and Zechner 2002; Reese 
and Weisbach 2002). To control for target nation shareholder and creditor protection we 
use the investor protection index {INVPROTECT) from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998). The index is calculated as the given nation’s Rule of Law 
score multiplied by its Anti-Director Rights score, which is then divided by 10.
On a similar note, we also use the national accounting standards index 
(ACCTSTAND) established by the Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research in 1991(LaPorta et al. 1998). The index serves as a proxy for the degree o f 
transparency to outside investors while considering multiple factors related to accounting 
and disclosure standards for each nation’s economy. As would be expected from the high 
income levels o f the target nations, both mean values for INVPROTECT and 
ACCTSTAND are relatively high, 0.6825 out of 1, and 71.57 out o f 100 respectively.
We also control for the similarity between the United States culture and the target 
firm national culture. The cultural proximity index (CULTPROX) we use was developed 
as a dummy variable by Sarkissian and Schill (2004). The variable takes on the value o f 
1 if either both the acquirer and the target countries share the same language, or if  the 
target was historically part of the same colonial empire as the acquirer, otherwise it takes 
on the value of 0. The cultural proximity index is shown to have a significant positive 
relationship with three and five year BHARs for cross-border and cross-listed targets in 
Cosset and Meknassi’s (2013a) empirical study involving 906 cross-border acquisitions, 
however, the relationship is weaker for cross-listed targets relative to the full sample.
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Also taken from Sarkissian and Schill (2004) we provide a variable for geographical 
distance between two nations, GEOPROX, which they measure as the distance9 between 
the two nation’s capital cities. Geographical distance has been shown to have a negative 
relationship on attracting foreign direct investment (Martin and Valazquez 1997; Bevan 
and Estrin 2004).
Acquiring Firm Characteristics
Acquisition literature also commonly links a few bidder firm characteristics to 
abnormal returns. Similarly to target characteristics we use firm size (SIZEA) measured 
as the logarithm of the target’s market capitalization in US dollars. Cosset and Meknassi 
(2013a) found support for the hubris hypothesis (Roll 1986) with a negative relationship 
between the size o f the acquirer and their abnormal returns. The hubris hypothesis 
suggests that larger acquirers are more likely to make poor acquisition decisions.
We also control for excess cash on hand with SDC’s measure o f free cash flows 
(FCFA), which is expected to have a negative relationship with stock returns according to 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. In a study o f cash reserves and acquisitions 
Harford (1999) found not only a negative relationship between “cash-rich” acquirers and 
returns, but also with the post-acquisition operating performance. Doukas (1995) also 
used a sample of US bidder/foreign targets and found that higher free cash flows result in 
greater agency problems between a firm and its owners. Jensen (1986) also suggests the 
presence o f high debt (LEVERAGEA) for an acquiring firm will have a positive 
relationship on acquirer returns. A firm choosing to issue debt often comes with a strong 
commitment for managers to work hard while mitigating the agency problem between
9 GEOPROX is measured as miles scaled by 1,000.
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stockholders and managers (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen 1986). Maloney, 
McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) find support this positive relationship between leverage 
and returns when analyzing United States bidder acquisitions throughout the 1960s, 70s, 
and 80s, as did Cosset and Meknassi (2013a) twenty years later.
Transaction Characteristics
The last set o f control variables taken from previous related literature concern the 
specific details o f the acquisition itself. First we consider the “industry diversification 
discount” shown to be present when the acquirer and target operate in different industries 
(Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1990; Doukas and Kan 2006). In a sample o f over 300 US 
based acquisitions, Morck et al. (1990) found lower bidder returns when acquiring a firm 
that does not have at least one four-digit SIC code in common with their target. Doukas 
and Kan (2006) focused more on industry diversification within the global diversification 
aspect and found support for the contingent claims hypothesis where bond holder value 
increases and shareholder values decreases from acquiring more industry distant firms. 
However, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) found an increase in long run returns when 
acquiring a same industry target, while some studies provide mixed results that unrelated 
targets may not directly influence the diversification discount in either direction (Campa 
and Kedia 2002; Villalonga 2004). In a sample o f over 4000 firms Campa and Kedia 
(2002) implore you must control for the endogeneity o f the decision to diversify. After 
doing this, their study shows the diversification discount is reduced, although still 
existent, yet the choice o f a firm to “refocus” can counteract the loss o f value from the 
initial diversification. To test and control for the industry diversification effect we create
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a dummy variable (TW0D1GSIC) which takes on the value o f 1 if the bidder and target 
share the same first two digits o f their SIC codes, and 0 otherwise.
The CULTPROXmean o f 0.5692 and TWODIGS1C mean of 0.5923 indicate that 
over half o f the sample acquisitions take place in highly related cultures and/or industries. 
These risk proxy variables indicate that regardless o f what some scholarly research 
results show, acquiring firms still look for familiarity and lower risk when considering 
foreign targets, and not just their financial statistics.
Another control variable is the log o f the US dollar value of the acquisition.
Taken from SDC our transaction size variable (DEALVALUE) is measured as the total 
value paid by the bidder, excluding fees and expenses. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) 
found the deal transaction size to have a highly significant positive influence on short run 
returns when comparing domestic acquisitions to cross border acquisitions.
Another transaction variable with mixed results in past literature is TOEHOLD, 
which measures the percentage o f shares owned by the acquiring firm prior to the new 
acquisition announcement. One side suggests that the greater the toehold, the lower the 
proportion o f shares the acquirer needs to purchase after the announcement, which 
decreases the targets bargaining power and creates an inverse relationship with the CARs 
(Hirshleifer and Titman 1990). However, other studies such as Bris (2002) have shown 
that the bid premium is lower after the toehold creates a run-up in the stock price when it 
is detected by the market. From Table 10 the average starting ownership by the acquiring 
firms was only 12.4%, while a few more than half of the observations started with no 
prior investment with the target firm.
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The last control variable is CONTESTED, which is a dummy variable that takes 
on the value of 1 if the target received acquisition interest from multiple bidding firms, 
otherwise it takes on the value of 0. Contested bids have been shown to lead to lower 
acquirer returns based on the winning firm needing to pay a higher premium following a 
back and forth bidding competition, which results in lower value extraction for the 
acquiring shareholders (Bradley, Desai and Kim 1988). Their study o f over 200 
acquisitions found short run returns are lower for the acquiring firm, yet larger for the 
target firm in a sample o f strictly NYSE and AMEX listed bidders and targets. However, 
they also find that the synergistic gains post-merger are larger for contested acquisitions, 
helping to partially offset the loss in value immediately surrounding the acquisition 
announcement. Only 10% of the observations in our sample were contested.
Estimation Procedure
We run our event study regression using OLS with robust standard errors to help 
correct for any heteroskedasticity or serial correlation. The equation is shown here:
Equation 1:
CAR =/?, + fi2CROSSLIST+ P.SIZET + P4LEVERAGET+ P,GROWTH! 
+ J36FCFT + PjCULTPROX+ PfiEOPROX+ j39INVPROTECT 
+ J310ACCTSTAND+ /?, XSIZEA + p nLEVERAGEA+ J3UFCFA 
+ PuTWODIGSia PX5DEAL VALUE+ p l6CONTESTED+ p..TOEHOLD
We complete this same regression for each of the dependent variables which were 
discussed previously. Based on the Bonding Hypothesis (Coffee 1999; Stulz 1999; Lei
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and Miller 2008) our primary variable o f interest is the CROSSLIST dummy which feeds 
our hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Firms acquiring a target company which, prior to the acquisition 
announcement, was cross-listed on a United States stock exchange will 
experience better short run and long run abnormal returns.
The correlation matrix can be seen in Table 11. Only two pairs o f variables have 
relatively high correlations, but each were anticipated and do not include our primary 
variable of interest. The first is between DEALVALUE and SIZET, which certainly 
makes sense that the larger the target firm is, the greater the cost of acquiring that firm 
should be. The second relationship is between the INVPROTECT and CULTPROX. The 
only three nations that share a language with the United States are Australia, Canada, and 
the United Kingdom; these nations also hold the three highest investor protection scores 
o f the target nations.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section we present the main results of the paper. We use an event study 
approach to investigate whether acquiring a foreign target that is cross-listed on a United 
States stock market leads to a better stock price performance for a US bidder than when 
acquiring a non-cross-listed foreign target. Our sample consists o f 130 US bidder/foreign 
target acquisitions completed between 1990 and 2010. 23 of the 130 foreign targets were 
cross-listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX prior to the acquisition announcement. 
The dependent variables are the short-run and long-run Abnormal Returns of the US
rmtxi
Crass-Listed Car relation Matrix
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t w o d k s i; -ooastf 00123 0.1301 0.0587 00383 0.1634 00382 01338 0.0337 02592 00248 00935 1.0000
DEALVALUE 02109 o xm 02039 0.1223 0.1238 00844 00393 00845 0.0306 02506 00896 00016 00277 1.0000
CONTESTED -00310 0.1561 00591 0.0405 00736 01519 O01S7 00525 01057 00119 0.0381 00189 01367 02015
TOEHOLD -00863 00330 00141 0.0547 0.1966 -02375 0.1191 02452 02464 00078 00184 0.1327 00994 03087
1.0000
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bidder, while our primary variable o f interest is the dummy variable, CROSSLIST, 
indicating if the target was cross-listed or not.
Table 12 provides the regression results for all five specifications. The only 
difference between each regression is the alternate measure o f the dependent variable.
We use both value weighted and equally weighted indexes to provide CARs for two time 
periods, (-1,1) and (-3, 3), surrounding the announcement date for each acquisition. A 
GARCH model is also applied to collect the 5 year BHARs. Due to the small sample of 
cross-listed targets, the primary variable o f interest, CROSSLIST, should be interpreted 
with caution, regardless o f significance levels.
The results o f CROSSLIST are negative across the board for short run returns, 
indicating that acquiring a foreign firm that is cross-listed in the bidder’s domestic capital 
market leads to decreased shareholder value for the acquiring firm immediately 
surrounding the acquisition announcement. However, each regression does not find 
statistical significance for the CROSSLIST variable, with a p-value o f (0.176) being the 
smallest for the value weighted (-3, 3) CAR model. The long run returns also do not find 
significance, however the coefficients are positive, indicating there is an initial negative 
reaction, but the long term effects o f acquiring that foreign firm wanting to hold itself to 
the high United States standards eventually adds value to the acquiring firm. The lack of 
significance in the short run is consistent with previous literature; however Cosset and 
Meknassi (2013a) found a positive coefficient for their cross-listing dummy variable. The 
same study found a positive significant relationship in the long run.
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TaU e XII
A cquiring  F irm  A nnouncem ent R etu rns
Ordinary leasl squares regression with five measurements o f stock return performance as the dependent variable. EW CAR (-1,1) is the three 
day equal w e t t e d  cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm surrounding the acquisition announcement date EW CAR (-3,3) is the 
seven day equal weigited cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm surrounding the acquisition announcement date VW CAR (-1,1) is 
the three day value weighted cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm surrounding the acquisition announcement date. VW CAR (- 
3,3) is the seven day value wei^ited cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm surrounding the acquisition announcement date BH AR 
S YEAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for the five year period following the acquisition announcement date. CROSSL1ST is a binary 
variable where one sigiifies if the target firm was cross-listed on a United States stock exchange prior to the acquisition announcement. SIZET 
is the log of the target firm market value four weeks prior to the announcement. LEVERAGET is the target firm total debt divided by total 
assets GROWTHT is the target firm three year average gow th rate in sales. FCFT is the target firm free cash flow divided by total assets 
CULTPROX is a binary variable where one signifies if both the acquirer and target nations speak the same language or were previously part of 
the same colonial empire. GEOPROX is the distance (1000 miles) between the capital city of the acquirer and target nations INVPROTECT 
is a measurement o f the target nation's legal protection of shareholders and creditors on a scale from zero to one ACCTSTAND is a 
measurement of the target nation's level o f transparency to outside investors as well as factors related to accounting and disclosure standards 
on a scale from zero to one. SIZEA is the log value of the acquiring firm’s market value four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement 
LEVERAGEA is the acquiring firm's total debt divided by total assets. FCFA is the acquiring firm's free cash flow divided by total assets 
TWODIGSIC is a binary variable where one sigiifies if the acquiringand target firms share the same two digit SIC code DEALVALUE is the 
log value o f the acquisition transaction cost CONTESTED is a binary variable where one signifies if there was more than one bidder for the 
target firm TOEHOLD is the percentage of target firm equity owned by the acquiring firm prior to the acquisition P-vaJues are provided in 
parenthesis, where * indicates significance at the 10% level; *• indicates significance at the S% level, ••*  indicates significance at the 1% level
EW CAR (-1,1) EW CAR (-3,3) VW  C A R (-1,1) VW  CA R (-3,3) BHAR 5 YEAR
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53
Overall, the only consistent significant variable is GROWTHT. All four CAR 
regressions find significance at the 0.05% level; however, each regression supports 
GROWTHT having a negative influence on the bidder’s stock returns. Earlier studies 
found higher growth to be attractive and positive for acquirer returns (Palepu 1986, 
Powell 1997), suggesting the high growth restrains the target firms making them worse 
off in negotiations. Our results show the opposite, that it is possible higher growth targets 
may be in a better position to negotiate, causing the acquiring firm to overpay for the 
target, therefore causing a decrease in the acquirer short run returns. Growth would also 
lead to a larger target size which would require larger deal values as well. Our results 
support the claim that targets with low growth are more suitable for bidder firms simply 
looking to absorb resources (Cosset and Meknassi 2013 b), as opposed to completing a 
mutually beneficial merger.
The BHARs regression also finds significance for GROWTHT, but here it has a 
small positive coefficient. This suggests recent success by the target firm initially makes 
for a more expensive and value decreasing deal surrounding the announcement, but 
perhaps the high growth and recent success of the target firm increases value in the long 
run do to the momentum and success that they bring to the partnership to help establish a 
positive synergy in the long run.
Target firm free cash flow has a significant negative relationship with just the 
value weighted and equal weighted CAR (-3,3) measurements, indicating a larger amount 
o f available cash on hand for a target firm leads to a decrease in bidder shareholder value. 
From the side o f the acquiring firm’s stock returns, free cash flows have been shown to 
result in lower abnormal returns after a cross-border acquisition (Lang et al. 1991). This
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result would also lend partial support to the positive relationship between free cash flows 
and agency costs (Jensen, 1986; Doukas 1995), causing these targets to be less attractive.
The variable ACCTSTAND also finds negative significance for both the value 
weighted and equal weighted CAR (-1, 1) returns. Although intuitively you might think 
acquiring firms with more transparent information environments would be ideal, but 
perhaps this also brings better negotiating ability and in turn, higher demands from the 
target firms. Less regulation and transparency within a target nation may reduce the 
complexity o f a merger and offer more straight forward negotiations between the two 
firms. We also have to consider the advanced economic level of our target nations, which 
all fall under high income or upper-middle income by the World Bank. If targets from the 
least developed nations or lower-middle income were to appear in the sample the results 
could vary.
The only other variables to receive significance were GEOPROX and SIZEA. The 
distance between two nations has a significant negative relationship at the 0.1% level for 
the equal weighted CAR (-3, 3) and 5 year BHAR. This result indicates the further the 
geographical distance is between the two partnering firms will result in lower returns for 
the bidder, which is consistent with previous findings (Martin and Valazquez 1997;
Bevan and Estrin 2004). The size o f the acquiring firm has a positive significant 
relationship for the value weighted CAR (-1, 1), which rejects the hubris hypothesis (Roll 
1986), which suggests larger acquirers are more likely to make poor decisions. However, 
both GEOPROX and SIZEA each only found significance in one of four regressions, 
therefore must be interpreted carefully.
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CONCLUSIONS
Essay 1 provides the first analysis o f the impact of inflation targeting on foreign 
direct investment and imports/exports. The majority of previous empirical research on 
inflation targeting has focused on, and found a significant impact in both control and 
reduction o f inflation. Inflation targeting has also been found to reduce and control 
exchange rates, while having a positive influence on GDP growth. We find similar 
positive results using FDI and negative results with imports/exports as the dependent 
variables while controlling for these previously tested macro-economic variables.
However, when analyzing only developing nations, which have greater potential 
to benefit from the inflation targeting policy (Calvo and Mishkin, 2003; Fraga et al., 
2003; Goncalves and Salles, 2008), we do not see as big o f improvements as with 
developed nations. When breaking up the developing nations into further sub-samples, 
we do find partial support that the inflation targeting policy may in fact be more suitable 
and helpful to lesser developed nations.
As young as the policy is, we may not have a sufficient amount o f data to 
properly analyze the relationship at this point in time, especially for the more recent 
adopting nations which are primarily developing. As countries continue practicing, and 
new countries join the trend, new research will be critical for further support of the 
inflation targeting policy. Future research may also explain if there is a plateau and/or 
eventual reversal o f the initial positive impacts. Future regressions for more specific 
sample groups may also be useful, such as the clusters previously discussed. In sum, we 
find that: (i) adoption of the inflation targeting monetary policy has a positive impact on
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FDI; (ii) when isolating developing nations, that impact loses some significance; (iii) the 
impact is larger for FDI inflows than FDI outflows; (iv) the relationship between FDI and 
imports/exports is that o f a substitute, not o f a compliment.
Essay 2 provides a fairly small sample of publically traded United States bidders 
acquiring a publically traded foreign target from 1990 through 2010. We focus on the 
decision o f the bidding firms to acquirer a foreign target that is or is not cross-listed on a 
stock exchange located in the bidder’s home country. We do not find support for our 
hypothesis that acquiring a cross-listed firm will lead to higher stock returns for the 
acquiring firm in the short run or the long run. Although our short run observations show 
the opposite that acquisitions involving a cross-listed target decrease the bidder’s 
shareholder value within the week surrounding the announcement, these results are not 
found to be significant. This finding is consistent with previous literature in that there is 
no significant short run effect for a bidder acquiring a cross-listed firm (Cosset and 
Meknassi 2013a). The BHARs do produce a positive coefficient consistent with the 
previous study, however our cross listing dummy is not found to be significant.
We also test previously used bidder, target and transaction characteristics and 
examine their impact on bidder returns. Target firm free cash flows are also significant in 
determining an acquisitions short run effect on shareholder value. Higher free cash flows 
lead to a decrease in shareholder value for acquiring firms surrounding the 
announcement, providing partial support for the positive relationship between free cash 
flows and agency costs (Jensen, 1986; Doukas 1995). Higher accounting standards 
within the target nations firm, along with distance between the US and the target nation
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each show partial significance for a negative influence on stock returns. The size o f the 
US acquiring firm also finds partial support for increasing their returns.
Although much of the M&A research over the years, including this study, show a 
negative impact to bidding firms in cross-border acquisitions, the trend o f globalization 
and integrated financial markets is not slowing down. The short run benefit by default 
seems to be completely absorbed by the target firms, while the positive long run results 
help counteract the short term loses. Cross-border acquisition research may need to 
consider a shift in their primary model structure. If targets are not seeing positive effect 
to shareholder value, perhaps there is a greater focus on long run financial analysis, 
synergistic gains post acquisition, or stakeholder value which keeps the cross-border 
M&A volume high.
There may also be alternative motives related to taxes which help keep the cross- 
border acquisition volume growing. Although we did, and previous studies commonly 
control for “Tax Haven” nations, the issue o f double taxation may be encouraging 
companies to maintain revenues from foreign nations within that nation. Instead of 
earning revenue abroad, which has to be taxed abroad, then bringing that revenue back 
into the home country to be taxed again, MNEs may be choosing to use revenues abroad, 
possibly for M&As, in order to avoid extra domestic taxes from their headquartered 
nation. Future cross-border M&A research should consider the alternative benefits, as 
well as the alternative motives for bidding firms to continue their involvement regardless 
o f the lack of increased shareholder value.
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